

## **Technocratic governance and democracy: key contradictions, their consequences and ways to overcome**

The article is devoted to the comparison of the concepts of technocracy/technocratic governance and democracy, as well as checking how democratic a nature of technocratic governance is. It was argued that technocratic governance is in opposition to democracy, but rather borders with autocracy (non-democracy) and found out that technocratic governance leads to weakening the procedures of delegation of authority and accountability between voters and parties, parties and governments, increasing external pressure on politicians and weakening ideological patterns of political process. The researcher confirmed that technocratic governments lack political competition, participation of citizens as key “principals” of democratic political regimes and political legitimacy. However, it was conceptualized that technocratic governance has both positive and negative moments through the prism of democracy: positive moments are short-term and negative moments are long-term. The author determined that the formation of technocratic governments in the long-term/repetitive perspective is not democratic, because it leads to patrimonialism of various inter-institutional relations. On the other hand, it was found that the more democratic is a political system, the greater is the likelihood that technocratic governments and technocratic governance will be temporary.

*Keywords: technocracy, technocratic government, technocratic governance, democracy.*

## **ТЕХНОКРАТИЧНЕ УРЯДУВАННЯ ТА ДЕМОКРАТІЯ: КЛЮЧОВІ ПРОТИРІЧЧЯ, ЇХ НАСЛІДКИ ТА ШЛЯХИ ПОДОЛАННЯ**

Стаття присвячена зіставленню концептів технократії/технократичного урядування та демократії, а також перевірці того, наскільки демократичною за своєю суттю є природа технократичного урядування. Аргументовано, що технократичне урядування є опозиційним демократії, а натомість суміжними з автократією (недемократією). Виявлено, що технократичне урядування зумовлює ослаблення процедур делегування повноважень і відповідальності та підзвітності між виборцями й партіями, партіями й урядами, збільшення зовнішнього тиску на політичних діячів, а також ослаблення ідеологічності політичного процесу. Підтверджено, що технократичним урядам бракує політичної конкуренції, участі громадян як ключового «принципала» демократичних політичних режимів і політичної легітимності. Водночас, концептуалізовано, що технократичне урядування крізь призму демократії має свої як позитивні, так і негативні моменти:

позитивні моменти є короткостроковими, а негативні – довгостроковими. Детерміновано, що формування технократичних урядів у довготривалій/повторюваній перспективі не є демократичним, адже призводить до патронажності варіативних систем міжінституційних відносин. З іншої сторони, виявлено, що чим більше демократичним є політичний режим, тим більшою є ймовірність, що технократичні уряди/технократичне урядування у ньому будуть тимчасовим.

**Ключові слова:** *технократія, технократичний уряд, технократичне урядування, демократія.*

The idea of technocratic/technical or expert governmental/managerial/state decisions as rational ones and those which are in the foundation of effective economic development induced appearing of various scientific views as to reasonability of managing in accordance with technocratic principles. On the one hand, the reason is vivid success of some countries, which managed to modernize applying technocratic model of management in their institutional and reformation development. On the other hand, technocratic governance comes under criticism in the light of its compatibility or incompatibility with principles and ideals of democracy and democratic political regime. It happens so, because in one case democratic development is an evolutionary phenomenon and satellite of modernity, and thus democracy is a result of social and economic development, but is not its precondition; in the other case the idea of technocratic governance can be just a front for stabilization and rooting of non-democratic political regimes, which appealing to technocratic intentions of governance, in fact do not conduct modernization and systematic reformation. Consequently, it is quite obvious that not all democratic and non-democratic regimes, which try out technocratic governance, have modernized themselves. Especially it can be observed in the case with authoritarian political regimes, as democratic political regimes statistically are more often modernized. All this brings about a question as to what extent the nature of technocratic governance is theoretically democratic, as well as what the primary divergences between democracy and technocracy are.

Responding to the question we appeal to scientific works by such scholars as O. Amorim Neto and K. Strøm<sup>1</sup>, D. Bell<sup>2</sup>, H. Brunkhorst<sup>3</sup>, J. Burnham<sup>4</sup>, M. Centeno and L. Wolfson<sup>5</sup>, R.

<sup>1</sup> O. Amorim Neto, K. Strøm, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619-643.

<sup>2</sup> D. Bell, *The coming of post-industrial society: a venture in social forecasting*, Wyd. Basic Books 1973.

<sup>3</sup> H. Brunkhorst, *The crisis of Europe as a Crisis of Technocratic Politics*, Unpublished lecture 2012.

<sup>4</sup> J. Burnham, *The Machiavellians: defenders of freedom*, Wyd. Gateway 1970.

<sup>5</sup> M. Centeno, *The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy*, "Theory and Society", 1993, vol 22, s. 307-335.; M. Centeno, L. Wolfson, *Redefiniendo la tecnocracia*, „Desarrollo Económico" 1997, vol 37, nr. 146, s. 215-240.

Dalton and M. Wattenberg<sup>6</sup>, J. Ellul<sup>7</sup>, R. Formica<sup>8</sup>, J. Galbraith<sup>9</sup>, D. Greenberg<sup>10</sup>, J. Gunnell<sup>11</sup>, J. Hopkin<sup>12</sup>, C. Invernizzi Accetti and B. Christopher<sup>13</sup>, J. Kysela and Z. Kuhn<sup>14</sup>, P. Mair<sup>15</sup>, D. McDonnell and M. Valbruzzi<sup>16</sup>, J. Meynaud<sup>17</sup>, G. Njalsson<sup>18</sup>, S. Odugbemi<sup>19</sup>, G. Pasquino and M. Valbruzzi<sup>20</sup>, G. Pastorella<sup>21</sup>, D. Price<sup>22</sup>, S. Scarrow<sup>23</sup>, S. Schmidt<sup>24</sup>, M. Schudson<sup>25</sup>, D. Skelton<sup>26</sup>, I. van Biezen, P. Mair and T. Poguntke<sup>27</sup>, M. Williams<sup>28</sup> and others. It is observed that peculiarity of applying technocratic governance and technocratic cabinets in democratic political regimes lies in the fact that the very phenomenon of loading political processes with the elements of technocracy is considered to be exceptional. The point is that in such cases apolitical nature/ neutrality of political process can be seen in the light of mainly political or social-economic crises and disturbances. Therefore, first of all from the perspective of the theory of a rational choice, politicians and politics must be neutral to overcome negative crisis phenomena within the shortest possible time. However, as politics is a phenomenon with an ideological coloring, it is worth considering that technocrats must be best in coping with task of neutrality.

At the same time, it was found out that the main danger of technocratic governance is that it "limits" democratic requirements, according to which people must elect those officials, who

<sup>6</sup> R. Dalton, M. Wattenberg, *Parties without partisans: political change in advanced industrial democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

<sup>7</sup> J. Ellul, *The Technological Society*, New York 1967.

<sup>8</sup> R. Formica, *Governo tecnico? La Costituzione non lo prevede*, Wyd. Stampa Libera 2011.

<sup>9</sup> J. Galbraith, *The new industrial state*, Wyd. Houghton-Mifflin 1971.

<sup>10</sup> D. Greenberg, *The Myth of the Scientific Elite*, "Public Interest" 1965, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 51-62.

<sup>11</sup> J. Gunnell, *The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy*, "Technology and Culture" 1982, vol 2, nr. 3, s. 392-416.

<sup>12</sup> J. Hopkin, *Technocrats have taken over governments in Southern Europe. This is a challenge to democracy*, Wyd. London School of Economics 2012.

<sup>13</sup> C. Invernizzi Accetti, B. Christopher, *Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements? Crisis and Representation*, Wyd. London School of Economics 2013.

<sup>14</sup> J. Kysela, Z. Kuhn, *Presidential elements in government – The Czech Republic*, "European Constitutional Law Review" 2007, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 91-113.

<sup>15</sup> P. Mair, *The Challenge to Party Government*, "EUI Working Paper SPS" 2007, nr. 9.

<sup>16</sup> D. McDonnell, M. Valbruzzi, *Defining and classifying technocrat-led and technocratic governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2014, vol 53, nr. 4, s. 654-671.

<sup>17</sup> J. Meynaud, *Technocracy*, Wyd. Faber and Faber 1968.

<sup>18</sup> G. Njalsson, *From autonomous to socially conceived technology: toward a causal, intentional and systematic analysis of interests and elites in public technology policy*, "Theoria: a journal of political theory" 2005, vol 108, s. 56-81.

<sup>19</sup> S. Odugbemi, *The Enduring Allurement of Technocratic Competence*, Wyd. People, Spaces, Deliberation 2011.

<sup>20</sup> G. Pasquino, M. Valbruzzi, *Non-partisan governments Italian-style: decision-making and accountability*, "Journal of Modern Italian Studies" 2012, vol 17, nr. 5, s. 612-629.

<sup>21</sup> G. Pastorella, *Technocratic governments: democracy by other means*, UACES General Conference, Panel: The Role of Expertise in Political Integration, Cork 2014, s. 2.; G. Pastorella, *Technocratic Governments in Europe: Getting the Critique Right*, "Political Studies" 2016, vol 64, nr. 4, s. 948-965.

<sup>22</sup> D. Price, *The scientific estate*, Wyd. Belknap Press 1965.

<sup>23</sup> S. Scarrow, *Declining memberships, changing members? European political party members in a new era*, "Party Politics" 2010, vol 16, nr. 6, s. 823-843.

<sup>24</sup> V. Schmidt, *Can Technocratic Government Be Democratic*, Wyd. Telos 2011.; V. Schmidt, *Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and 'Throughput'*, "Political Studies" 2013, vol 61, nr. 1, s. 2-22.

<sup>25</sup> M. Schudson, *The Trouble with Experts and Why Democracies Need Them*, "Theory and Society" 2006, vol 35, nr. 5, s. 491-506.

<sup>26</sup> D. Skelton, *Government of the technocrats, by the technocrats, for the technocrats*, Wyd. New Statesman 2011.

<sup>27</sup> I. Van Biezen, P. Mair, T. Poguntke, *Going, going, ... gone? The decline of party membership in contemporary Europe*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2012, vol 51, nr. 1, s. 24-56.

<sup>28</sup> M. Williams, *Escaping the Zero-Sum Scenario: Democracy versus Technocracy in Latin America*, "Political Science Quarterly" 2006, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 119-139.

exercise power/governance. That is why technocratic government a priori cannot be seen as those which “run for” certain positions. It often happens, that technocratic modernization of social and economic processes in certain countries may take place in parallel with limitation of democratic institutionalization processes, what is revealed in “separation” from a classical rule, due to which “people elect people”. That kind of logic, for instance, is used to guarantee “survival” of authoritarian regimes, when elections are held on a regular basis and there is an illusion of representativeness, but in fact the country is developing in accordance with the patterns of subordination and “moderate repressiveness”. From this perspective technocratic governance as an idea of possessing power is in the focus of leaders of almost all authoritarian regimes as the slogan “modernization” serves a basis for additional legitimation of political power. As a result of this it is quite obvious that from the theoretical and methodological point of view technocratic governance restrains democratic tradition not only under conditions of a single-party system, but in general in case of all possible variants of non-party politics and autocracy, in particular in the context of the so-called military/war political regimes, client-like types of multi-party regimes, neo-patrimonial regimes etc<sup>29</sup>. And it results into theoretical and methodological positioning, according to which formation of technocratic governmental cabinets and technocratic model of governance often leads to transformation of the idea of representative democracy into the practice of “delegative dictatorship”. In particular it argues that further establishing of conventionality/traditionalism of technocratic governance limits the process of formation and institutionalization of democracy, as electorate stop determining/electing those who are real leaders in an executive vertical.

Such theorization of a negative connection between technocratic governance and democracy has economic, political and philosophical background and is rooted in the postulate, according to which a model of technocratic governance is less democratic (if non-democratic at all), than the idea of political/party governance, if only because technical or leadership qualities, which make the foundation of technocratic governance are determined on the basis of “special” knowledge and productivity. That is why technocratic governance is characterized by such patterns as: meritocracy – process of decision-taking on the basis of current knowledge, and oligarchy – process of decision-taking on the basis of assigned capitals, financial influence and interference in governance of specialized groups of interest. Therewith, G. Njalsson<sup>30</sup> theorizes, that technocratic governance to any extent is based on representativeness of specific specialized groups of interest (certain social and lobby-groups, coopted into politics through the so-called “econocrats” and “bureaucrats”) in a political process or in a process of state governance, and thus is carried out on the basis of a cognitive set of directions aimed at solving management issues. Just in connection with this scientists suppose that “technostructure”

<sup>29</sup> L. Graham, *The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1993, s. 73-74.

<sup>30</sup> G. Njalsson, *From autonomous to socially conceived technology: toward a causal, intentional and systematic analysis of interests and elites in public technology policy*, “Theoria: a journal of political theory” 2005, vol 108, s. 56-81.

(elements of technocratic governance) tends to avoid categorical transition to a platform of any political party, and on the contrary prefers “to adjust oneself to a currently political party in force”. There is numerous historical evidence of this fact, as technocrats, for example, successfully cooperated with fascist totalitarian regimes and authoritarian dictatorship regimes as well as liberal-democratic regimes.

In a like manner M. Weber<sup>31</sup> argues that instrumental rationality of technical or technocratic governance of bureaucrats (even despite the emphasis on its rational and legal nature and procedural rules of decision-taking processes) largely tends to transformation into an autonomous form of politics formation, and therefore encroaching on politics function itself. As a result, the scientist states that technocratic bureaucracy does not suit to implementation of the mentioned function, as embracing “worldview neutrality” it is often a derivative from conservative convictions of “higher” classes’ representatives, where, as a rule, bureaucrats/technocrats are recruited. That is why, as M. Weber supposes, just when a politician must seek support in a competitive civil/political forum, a bureaucrat/technocrat is responsible only from the views and perspective of qualification standards and effectiveness. Correspondingly, the problem of modern society and technocratic governance as its component is limitation of bureaucrats/technocrats as to the relevant role, and thus prevention of their “undermining” activity in the sphere of neutralizing democratic political will. It is especially urgent question with regard to the fact that technocratic bureaucratization is not just a form of state governance, but it rationalizes tendencies of all associative characteristics of modern life, including legislation and economy. This, in its turn, is a precondition for theorization and agitation as to the fact that technocracy largely restrains significance of a political sphere, undermines traditional comprehension of power and political rationality. More specific worries appear due to the problem of bypassing or atrophy of political institutions of democratic representation. That is why R. Lipp argues that scientists holding crucial consultative positions have great power, however decisions taken by several technically qualified employees do not “dictate” civil control over the taken decisions and can generate situations, where an “ordinary method of restraints and counterbalance in democracy may be not enough”<sup>32</sup>.

By analogy, though on the basis of the elitist democracy theory, J. Ellul<sup>33</sup> states that dominance of “techniques” in a modern society (technocratic governance) usually “undermines democracy” and “creates new aristocracy”. In this case politics is positioned only by “illusion” and a correct choice of political problems depends on technical professionals, who make decisions, aimed at power implementation. As a result, the risk of technocratic governance is that a powerful state is transformed into a simple tool of influence in hands of technocrats. It can be observed as politics under conditions of technocratic governance has a tendency to “shift

<sup>31</sup> H. Gerth, W. Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.

<sup>32</sup> R. Lipp, *The new priesthood: the scientific elite and the uses of power*, New York 1965, s. 2-3.

<sup>33</sup> J. Ellul, *The Technological Society*, New York 1967, s. 274.

towards executive power". And this, indeed, is just "a stage in gradual liquidation of political action in itself". Generally, it means that growth of the technocratic component and technocratic governance is a "symptom" of many circumstances, which "necessarily subordinate political decisions to technical estimations", and goals to results. Thus, appears a perception that technocracy is a kind of elitism, where ruling elite combines the most qualified representatives. Such elite is chosen/formed on the principles of professional training and not democratic elections<sup>34</sup>. It creates the impression that technocrats "perform" politics, which is grounded exclusively on technical criteria, unlike politicians, who take their decisions depending on next elections. In its turn, such dichotomy means that political recommendations of technocrats may have much larger influence, than political recommendations of elected officials. Therefore, technocrats may be connected with non-democratic procedures in the process of decision making<sup>35</sup>. In other words, it can be done beyond the parliament, politics, first of all, is carried out by bureaucrats-technocrats, who are not accountable to electorate. And this contradicts the idea that politicians take decisions, and bureaucrats/technocrats govern them. Consequently, in this perspective namely officials and technocrats take decisions and implement them.

The point is that the decisions taken by technocrats and technocratic governmental cabinets not to the full extent (though can be based on credibility of parliamentary parties or non-affiliated deputies) but correspond to constructions of legitimacy of political power ("the chain of delegation of authority and responsibility" among the head of the state, parliament and government). As a result, in the context of technocratic governments/technocratic governance executive power is exercised by officials, accountable only to the legislative branch and/or head of the state, however who are not elected by people (as it is in case with party governments/party governance). Besides, responsibility for such governments' activity is partially on publicly elected parties, which entrust "executive mandates" to such cabinets. All this clearly shows that in this "chain of responsibility", non-party technocratic governments and technocratic systems of governance make one significant theoretical problem, which may explain the practice of their insignificant presence in some regimes and predominance in others. The problem is supplemented by the fact that just under the conditions of technocratic governments and technocratic governance are "undermined" requirements towards representative democracy, as electorate loses the potential of associating themselves with political parties<sup>36</sup>.

On average, in various studies devoted to the given problem as G. Pastorella<sup>37</sup> says, it is uncovered that technocratic governance and technocracy in general in their etymological comprehension and as to their definition are in opposition to democracy, and even have much in common

<sup>34</sup> X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, "Asian Survey" 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 789.

<sup>35</sup> B. Schneider, *The material bases of technocracy: Investor confidence and neoliberalism in Latin America*, [w:] M. Centeno, P. Silva (eds.), *The Politics of Expertise in Latin America*, Wyd. St Martin's Press 1998, s. 77.

<sup>36</sup> P. Mair, *The Challenge to Party Government*, "EUI Working Paper SPS" 2007, nr 9.

<sup>37</sup> G. Pastorella, *Technocratic governments: democracy by other means*, UACES General Conference, Panel: The Role of Expertise in Political Integration, Cork 2014, s. 2.; G. Pastorella, *Technocratic Governments in Europe: Getting the Critique Right*, "Political Studies" 2016, vol 64, nr. 4, s. 948-965.

with autocracy (non-democracy). Therewith, alongside with populism they (technocracy and technocratic governance) are “Scylla and Charybdis” of democratic ideals, and “political pathology”<sup>38</sup>, which can cause “the end of the democracy we all know”<sup>39</sup>. Nevertheless, the combination of technocratic and non-democratic governance can be a direct predecessor of democratic regime establishment in one country or another, or even in one region or another. It is determined by the fact, that the essence of technocratic governance, as the political practices show, was initially tested on the examples of non-democratic political regimes in various countries and in various regions. And only after that the non-democratic nature of technocratic governance and technocracy was scientifically proved or refuted. Consequently a number of scientists, in particular D. Bell<sup>40</sup>, J. Burnham<sup>41</sup>, M. Centeno and L. Wolfson<sup>42</sup>, J. Galbraith<sup>43</sup>, D. Price<sup>44</sup>, M. Schudson<sup>45</sup>, M. Williams<sup>46</sup>, argue that technocracy and technocratic governance are of no serious hazard to democracy, as they cannot “challenge” the political nature of leadership in democratic regimes. D. Bell<sup>47</sup>, for instance, notes that in the post-industrial society technical skills make a base and grounds for accession to power, and those elite groups, which come to the foreground of the model, are scientists. Besides, taking into account that the notion of “technocracy” in the West goes beyond the frames and acts within the notions of political liberty and democracy, a western technocrat, as a rule, is much more inclined to technical, and not political issues, and that is why employs such specificity to implement tasks and not to exercise power<sup>48</sup>. Even taking this into consideration, technocrats can abuse their power and undermine foundations and principles of democracy, as they take control over the information flows. However, another group of scientists warns about the non-democratic/autocratic nature and consequences of scientification/juridification of political processes on the basis of technocratic governance. In addition to the abovementioned, such position is peculiar of the researchers of political regimes, but not the investigators of technocracy. The point is that, the “hazard” of technocracy and its principal non-compatibility with democracy are depicted by the theoreticians of democratic regimes, as well as the researchers of autocratic/non-democratic regimes, who assume that there is some connection between technocratic and non-democratic governance. Thus, J. Meynaud<sup>49</sup> states that technocrats are determined by the desire to simplify the political arena by means of elimination and suppression of different political

<sup>38</sup> J. Gunnell, *The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy*, “Technology and Culture” 1982, vol 2, nr. 3, s. 392.

<sup>39</sup> H. Brunkhorst, *The crisis of Europe as a Crisis of Technocratic Politics*, Unpublished lecture 2012.

<sup>40</sup> D. Bell, *The coming of post-industrial society: a venture in social forecasting*, Wyd. Basic Books 1973.

<sup>41</sup> J. Burnham, *The Machiavellians: defenders of freedom*, Wyd. Gateway 1970.

<sup>42</sup> M. Centeno, *The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy*, “Theory and Society”, 1993, vol 22, s. 307-335.; M. Centeno, L. Wolfson, *Redefiniendo la tecnocracia*, „Desarrollo Económico” 1997, vol 37, nr. 146, s. 215-240.

<sup>43</sup> J. Galbraith, *The new industrial state*, Wyd. Houghton-Mifflin 1971.

<sup>44</sup> D. Price, *The scientific estate*, Wyd. Belknap Press 1965.

<sup>45</sup> M. Schudson, *The Trouble with Experts and Why Democracies Need Them*, “Theory and Society” 2006, vol 35, nr. 5, s. 491-506.

<sup>46</sup> M. Williams, *Escaping the Zero-Sum Scenario: Democracy versus Technocracy in Latin America*, “Political Science Quarterly” 2006, vol 121, nr. 1, s. 119-139.

<sup>47</sup> D. Bell, *The coming of post-industrial society: a venture in social forecasting*, Wyd. Basic Books 1973, s. 358.

<sup>48</sup> X. Zang, *The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?*, “Asian Survey” 1993, vol 33, nr. 8, s. 789.

<sup>49</sup> J. Meynaud, *Technocracy*, Wyd. Faber and Faber 1968.

actors. Technocrats are less flexible, consensus-oriented and pragmatic than politicians are, and to a large extent they are inclined to commit political errors and blunders. Moreover, technocrats usually focus on planning, economic, but not political criteria of governance, as they use detailed and technically-oriented techniques of governance, what can greatly assist in transforming political regimes into authoritarian.

However, as G. Pastorella<sup>50</sup> argues, that it is quite evident that the mainstream problems of connection between technocratic governance and democracy are certain scientific opinions, in according to which: a) disturbance of the very fact of a technocratic government and technocratic governance is presupposed by the institutional constructions which reveal those drawbacks of democracy which are hidden in party governments, namely weakening of the procedures concerning delegation of authority and responsibilities as well as accountability between electorate and parties, parties and governments, increasing external pressure on politicians and weakening ideological patterns of political process<sup>51</sup>; b) technocratic governments and technocratic governance are often constitutionally unregulated<sup>52</sup>, though on the other hand, they are not forbidden constitutionally<sup>53</sup>; c) technocratic governments and governance are less determined by rationalist logics, as they do not correlate with the mechanisms of transferring cabinet positions conventional in democratic regimes and are not interested in gaining electoral support of people<sup>54</sup> (though succumb to the procedures of vote of investiture and non-confidence); d) technocratic government is a symptom of crisis and “undermines” institutionalized form of party democracy phenomenon<sup>55</sup>, and thus contributes to “growth” of populist party and party systems; e) governments of technocratic type and models of governing generated by them lack political competitiveness and participation of people as a key “principal” of democratic political regimes<sup>56</sup>; f) technocracy and technocratic governance lack political legitimacy<sup>57</sup>, even on the background of party-populist governance.

However, it is possible to solve the problem of mutual correlation between technocratic governance and democracy. J. Meynaud apprehends it in the possibility to do technical functions of governance more “accountable for their actions to democratic power” and reassures that they are

<sup>50</sup> G. Pastorella, *Technocratic governments: democracy by other means*, UACES General Conference, Panel: The Role of Expertise in Political Integration, Cork 2014, s. 2.

<sup>51</sup> O. Amorim Neto, K. Strom, *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, “British Journal of Political Science” 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619-643.; G. Pasquino, M. Valbruzzi, *Non-partisan governments Italian-style: decision-making and accountability*, “Journal of Modern Italian Studies” 2012, vol 17, nr. 5, s. 612-629.; N. Urbinati, M. Warren, *The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory*, “Annual Review of Political Science” 2008, vol 11, s. 403.; S. Odugbemi, *The Enduring Allurement of Technocratic Competence*, Wyd. People, Spaces, Deliberation 2011.

<sup>52</sup> R. Formica, *Governo tecnico? La Costituzione non lo prevede*, Wyd. Stampa Libera 2011.

<sup>53</sup> J. Tully, *The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy*, “The Modern Law Review” 2002, vol 65, nr. 2, s. 206.; J. Kysela, Z. Kuhn, *Presidential elements in government – The Czech Republic*, “European Constitutional Law Review” 2007, vol 3, nr. 1, s. 98.

<sup>54</sup> G. Pasquino, L. James, P. Mancini, *The future of the Western liberal order*, Wyd. T. Academy 2013.

<sup>55</sup> C. Invernizzi Accetti, B. Christopher, *Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements? Crisis and Representation*, Wyd. London School of Economics 2013.; S. Hanley, *Unexpected consequences of an unexpected Prime Minister? The 2009-10 Fischer administration in the Czech Republic*, EUSA Thirteen Biennale Conference, Baltimore 2013.; G. Pasquino, M. Valbruzzi, *Non-partisan governments Italian-style: decision-making and accountability*, “Journal of Modern Italian Studies” 2012, vol 17, nr. 5, s. 612-629.

<sup>56</sup> M.-C. Esposito, M. Christine, *Populismes: l'émers de la démocratie*, Wyd. Vendémiaire 2012, s. 15.

<sup>57</sup> D. Skelton, *Government of the technocrats, by the technocrats, for the technocrats*, Wyd. New Statesman 2011.



“under control of supreme power”, combined of “elected representatives”<sup>58</sup>. On the other hand, it is known that in practice there has not been created any effective and direct formula how to implement democracy with technocratic governance. A bit different strategy of solving the above-mentioned problem of correlation between technocratic governance and democracy is proposed by J. Ellul<sup>59</sup>, who believes “depolitization and repolitization” to be the only answer. As nowadays techniques/technocracy is more and more merging with a country, it is necessary to avoid this state, and then to resume democratic control over the country and managerial apparatus. Such logic is rather obvious taking into account the fact, that despite apparent problems of connection between knowledge and power in modern society, science and democracy are to complement each other in future as well. The point is that modern democracy requires participation of a scientist, while the scientist must bear civil responsibility. In that regard S. Lakoff believes that “the main reason, as it was before, is still fear of technocracy that democratic theories have not caught with democratic practice yet”<sup>60</sup>. However, it is quite an apparent phenomenon, especially from Yu. Habermas’ standpoint<sup>61</sup> that technique/technology cannot but be under control of a democratic society.

Thus, we came to a conceptual conclusion on our research that in the context of democracy technocratic governance has both positive and negative moments: positive moments are short-term, while negative are long-term. It means that if a technocratic government is created for the purpose of steering the country out of political and economic crisis, then it is likely to have positive result on the process of governance (in particular as a result of collective unified force of political responsibility, and not a diversified disagreement of political parties). However, when technocratic governmental cabinets or technocratic governance in general become conventional and permanent, it significantly undermines the idea of democratic governance, accountability and political responsibility, leads to personalization of a political process. It is reasoned by the fact, that namely responsibility is a cornerstone idea, which is formally established in the institutional frames of modern democracy’s development. With that in mind, the very idea of establishing technocratic governments and technocratic governance in long-term/continual perspective is not democratic, as it leads to protection form of variable systems of inter-institutional relations. On the other hand, we conclude that the more democratic a political regime is, the higher is the possibility that technocratic governments/technocratic governance there will be temporary. On the contrary, authoritarianization of political regime leads to the fact that the phenomenon and practice of technocratic/non-party government formation become conventional.

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<sup>58</sup> J. Meynaud, *Technocracy*, Wyd. Faber and Faber 1968, s. 299.

<sup>59</sup> J. Ellul, *The Technological Society*, New York 1967, s. 274.

<sup>60</sup> S. Lakoff, *Knowledge, Power, and Democratic Theory*, “Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science” 1972, vol 394, s. 10.; D. Greenberg, *The Myth of the Scientific Elite*, “Public Interest” 1965, vol 1, nr. 1, s. 51-62.

<sup>61</sup> J. Habermas, *Toward a rational society: student protest, science, and politics*, Boston 1970, s. 59-60.

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